Breaking News! On June 21, the U.S. Senate approved a $1 billion aid package to Colombia for the purpose of equipping the Colombian military to combat insurgent forces and drug trafficking. The aid package will now be reconciled in a conference committee between the House and Senate. The House approved a $1.7 billion aid package to Colombia on March 30. Details are available in the Senate Bill Status section of this paper.

I. Colombia Background

Size: Colombia is 439,735 square miles (1,138,910 square kilometers) and is almost 50,000 square miles larger than the entire Eastern seaboard of the U.S. including Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. (Source: CIA World Factbook 1999, www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook).

Population: In 1999, Colombia’s population was 39,309,422. (Source: CIA World Factbook 1999, www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook).

Economy: Colombia’s GDP in 1997 was $96 billion, compared to $8.511 trillion in the U.S. Colombia’s per capita GDP was $2,446 while the U.S per capita GDP was $29,142.63 in 1997. (Source: State Department, Background Notes, 1999, Iowa State University, www.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ355/choi/rank.htm).

Unemployment: Unemployment in Colombia currently exceeds 20%. (Source: Gen. Barry McCaffrey, Director, White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, “Rescuing Colombia,” Boston Globe, March 2, 2000).

Exports: Colombia’s major licit exports are petroleum, coffee, coal, gold, bananas, and cut flowers. Their total licit exports totaled at $11.3 billion in 1998. (Source: CIA World Factbook 1999, www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook).

II. COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT

President: Andres Pastrana was elected August 7, 1998, and holds office until 2002. He is a member of the Social Conservative Party (Partido Social Conservador). (Source: State Department, Background Notes, 1999, www.state.gov/www/background_notes/colombia_0199_bgn.html).

Colombian Congress: The Colombian Congress is composed of two primary parties and more than twenty smaller parties. The two large parties are the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal) and the Social Conservative Party (Partido Social Conservador). There are 161 members of the Colombian House of Representatives and 102 members of the Colombian Senate. The Partido Liberal holds the majority in both the House and the Senate with 54.0% and 55.9% respectively. (Source: Agorà Telematica, www.electionworld.org/election/colombia.htm).

Ambassador: Colombia’s ambassador to the U.S. is Luis Alberto Moreno Mejia. The embassy can be contacted at 2118 Leroy Place, NW, Washington, DC 20008, phone: (202) 387-8338, fax: (202) 232-8643. (Source: CIA World Factbook 1999, www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook).

III. INSURGENT FORCES

There are three organized left-wing insurgent groups: The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is the largest insurgent group operating in Colombia with approximately 15,000 members. The FARC is led by Manuel Marulanda Vélez. The second largest insurgent group is the National Liberation Army (ELN), led by Nicolás Rodríguez. The ELN has approximately 5,000 members. The third major insurgent group in Colombia is the People’s Liberation Army (EPL) with approximately 500 members. The EPL is led by Francisco Carballo, who is currently imprisoned. (Source: Center for International Policy, www.us.net/cip/colombia/infocombat.htm). The U.S. State Department has designated both the FARC and the ELN as “foreign terrorist organizations” for their involvement in “terrorist activity” that threatens the security of U.S. nationals or national security. According to the State Department, both the FARC and the ELN are engaged in the illegal drug trade. (Source: The U.S. State Department, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” October 1998, The Washington Office on Latin America notes that the insurgents’ involvement in the drug trade is limited to the taxation and protection of coca crops: “Although politicians in Washington frequently use the term ‘narcoguerrillas’ to imply a complete integration of Colombia’s drug cartels and guerrillas, there is no evidence that FARC and other insurgent groups are involved in the illicit industry’s most lucrative stages: transshipment and the sale of drugs on the international market.” (Source: Winifred Tate, Washington Office on Latin America, “In Focus: Colombia’s Role in International Drug Industry,” Volume 4, Number 30, November 1999, www.wola.org).

IV. RIGHT-WING PARAMILITARIES

There are hundreds of paramilitary groups in Colombia. The largest paramilitary group is the United Self-defense Groups of Colombia (AUC), with between 5,000 and 7,000 members. The AUC is actually a coalition of paramilitary groups led by Carlos Castano. (Source: Center for International Policy, www.us.net/cip/colombia/infocombat.htm). According to the Drug Enforcement Administration, the paramilitary groups “provide security for cocaine laboratories and clandestine airstrips in the northern and central parts of the country.” Carlos Castano is cited as one of “certain paramilitary leaders” who have “become major drug traffickers in their own right.” (Source: Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, “Colombia: The Problem of Illegal Narcotics and U.S.-Colombia Relations, 1998, p. 4).

V. COLOMBIAN MILITARY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

Army: The Colombian Army has 120,000 soldiers with 50,000 available for combat. The remaining 70,000 soldiers have administrative duties or protect national infrastructure.

Police: The Colombian National Police (CNP) is the lead agency for counter-drug activities. They have approximately 120,000 officers.

Air Force: The Air Force has approximately 10,000 servicemen. Their primary duty is to defend national borders, however, they also aid in combating the insurgent groups.

Navy: The Colombian Navy has approximately 5,000 sailors. Their primary function is to protect maritime borders, however, they also confront insurgents while patrolling Colombian rivers.

Citizen Groups: The Special Vigilance and Private Security Services (CONVIVIR) was created by the Colombian government in 1994 to “license” citizens to defend themselves. There are over 400 CONVIVIR groups in rural Colombia. Many of these groups have been implicated in a large number of human rights violations. In March, 1999, President Andres Pastrana pledged to begin dismantling the CONVIVIR groups. (Source: Center for International Policy, www.us.net/cip/colombia/infocombat.htm).

VI. VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA

Violence in Colombia is the leading cause of death. With a record 25,100 violent deaths in 1992, Colombia's murder rate is approximately nine times that of the United States. Of those deaths, at least 4,100 were politically motivated. (Source: www.fas.org/asmp/library/scourge/scourge-CH1.html).

Data on the number of human rights workers, government employees, and academics who are murdered or kidnapped in Colombia is scarce. In the first nine months of 1999, two human rights defenders were killed and dozens more were threatened. Two academics, Julio Gonzalez and Everardo de Jesus Puerta,who worked in favor of human rights with the Committee of Solidarity with Political Prisoners (Comité de Solidaridad con los Presos Políticos, CSPP), were also murdered. Subsequent threats forced the CSPP to suspend activities for several months.

Several other human rights groups closed their doors because of threats. The Association of Family Members of Victims of Trujillo (Asociación de Familiares de las Víctimas de Trujillo, AFAVIT) suffered repeated threats, and more than fifty AFAVIT members won political asylum in Canada in 1999. More than thirty others were forced to leave Colombia in 1998 and 1999.

According to reports, surveillance of human rights groups in Colombia is open and aggressive. Telephones have been tapped so callers could hear those listening eating, turning newspaper pages, and listening to music. Several offices reported having their calls blocked, cut off, or detoured to telephones in military barracks. One group discovered that a false non-governmental organization was set up by military intelligence to monitor their activities. Fear that the military and paramilitaries had infiltrated offices to report on the movements of key leaders was widespread. (Source: Human Rights Watch, “World Report 1999: Colombia,” www.hrw.org/wr2k/americas-03.htm).

VII. COLOMBIAN AID PACKAGE

Plan Colombia: Plan Colombia was introduced by President Pastrana on October 22, 1998, to improve economic development, political reform, negotiation of peace, and citizen security. Pastrana described Plan Colombia as, “a collection of alternative development projects that will create an economic, social, and production transformations in the conflict zones." Over time, different aid proposals to Colombia shifted the emphasis from social spending to an almost exclusively militarized aid package. The Clinton Administration’s aid proposal, while ostensibly designed to support Pastrana’s Plan Colombia, fell short of this goal with over 80% of the aid allocated for security forces for counternarcotics operations. (Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia, Replies of the Minister of Foreign Relations and the Presidential High Commissioner for Political and Social Affairs and Director of Plan Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia, December 10, 1999, www.emcolbru.org/copaz27in.htm; Winifred Tate, Washington Office on Latin America,“In Focus: Colombia’s Role in International Drug Industry,” Volume 4, Number 30, November 1999, www.wola.org).

HR 3908: On March 30, the U.S. House of representatives approved a $8.9 billion emergency supplementary appropriations package in a 263-146 vote. In addition to the Colombian aid, the House bill (HR 3908) also includes appropriations for flood relief for North Carolina, funding for U.S. troops in Kosovo, and numerous other items. Of the $1.701 billion appropriated for anti-drug activities, 63% – $1.007 billion – will go to Colombia. This appropriation is in addition to $330 million for Colombian anti-narcotics aid already planned for FY 2000 and FY 2001. Thus, the total proposed aid to Colombia for FY 2000 and FY 2001 is $1.337 billion. (Source: Center for International Policy, “U.S. Aid to Colombia,” www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid).

Amendments to HR 3908: The following is a comprehensive list of amendments offered that are relevant to the Colombian aid:

Passed Amendments:

H.AMDT.620 was introduced by Rep. Thomas Sawyer (D-OH) to earmark $50 million for assistance for internally displaced persons in Colombia. The amendment passed by voice vote.

H.AMDT.622 was introduced by Rep. Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) to make the delivery of military assistance to Colombia contingent on Presidential certification of the following: (1) agreement by the government of Colombia to a strategy to completely eliminate illicit drug cultivation by 2005; (2) Colombia’s armed forces having the authority to dismiss persons for gross violations of human rights; (3) Colombia’s armed forces cooperating with civilian authorities in the investigation and prosecution in civilian courts of gross human rights abuses by armed forces personnel; and (4) Colombia’s armed forces developing a Judge Advocate General Corps. The amendment passed by a recorded vote of 380-39.

H.AMDT.643 was introduced by Rep. Gene Taylor (D-MS) to provide that none of the funds made available in the bill may be used for the support of more than 300 United States military personnel in Colombia. The amendment was agreed to by voice vote.

Failed Amendments:

H.AMDT.617 was introduced by Rep. David Obey (D-WI) to reduce funding for counternarcotics activities by $552 million. The amendment failed by a recorded vote of 186-239.

H.AMDT.618 was introduced by Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) to reduce funding for U.S. Department of Defense counter-drug activities by $51 million. The amendment failed by voice vote.

H.AMDT.621 was introduced by Rep. Gene Taylor (D-MS) to limit the number of U.S. military personnel to not more than 300. Rep. C.W. Bill Young (R-FL) raised a point of order against the amendment that it sought to change the existing law and thus constituted legislation in an appropriations bill. The Chair sustained the point of order.

H.AMDT.624 was introduced by Rep. Jim Ramstad (R-MN) to strike all Title I spending from the bill. Title I deals with counternarcotics spending. The amendment failed by a recorded vote of 158-262.

H.AMDT.625 was introduced by Rep. Sam Farr (D-CA) to provide funds for the United Nations Drug Control Program that will be directed to Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Colombia. Rep. C.W. Bill Young (R-FL) raised a point of order against the amendment that it sought to change the existing law and thus constituted legislation in an appropriations bill. The Chair sustained the point of order.

H.AMDT.642 was introduced by Rep. Ron Paul (R-TX) to reduce funding in the bill including: Drug enforcement Administration; Department of Defense Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities; Assistance for Plan Colombia and for Andean Regional Counternarcotics Activities. The amendment also sought to that none of the funds made available on the Title I for “Military Construction, Defense-Wide” may be used for construction outside of the United States or any of its territories or possessions; and none of the funds made available in Title II may be used for operations in Kosovo or East Timor, other than the return of United States personnel and property to the United States. The amendment failed by a recorded vote of 45-367 (Source: Library of Congress, Thomas, www.loc.gov).

H.R. 3908 Aid Summary: The supplemental Colombian aid proposal falls into eight categories: (1) military assistance – $700.7 million (52%); (2) police assistance – $386.7 million (29%); (3) alternative development – $118.0 million (9%); (4) aid to the displaced – $39.5 million (3%); (5) law enforcement/rule of law – $45.5 million (3%); (6) judicial reform – $26.5 million (2%); (7) human rights – $19.0 million (1%); and (8) the peace process – $1.0 million (0%). The only change in spending in HR 3908 after the amendments are considered is an additional $50 million for assistance for internally displaced persons in Colombia. It is not yet known where the funds will come from. (Source: Center for International Policy, “U.S. Aid to Colombia,” www.us.net/cip/index.htm).

Senate Bill Status: The Colombian aid package is part of S. 2522, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2001.

Committee Actions: On May 9, the Senate Appropriations Committee held their mark up of the bill. Sen. Slade Gorton (R-WA) introduced an amendment to decrease the military aid to Colombia from $900 million to $100 million. The amendment failed by a vote of 11-to-15. The overall package was cut to $1 billion.

Full Senate Actions: On June 21, the Senate considered the Colombian aid package. Sen. Paul Wellstone (D-MN) introduced an amendment (S.AMDT.3518) to strike all military aid to Colombia for the push into Southern Colombia. The $225 million that is earmarked for the push into Southern Colombia would be spent on domestic treatment and drug prevention programs under Sen. Wellstone’s amendment. The Wellstone amendment failed by a vote of 89-to-11. Sen. Slade Gorton (R-WA) introduced an amendment (S.AMDT.3517) cutting the Colombian aid package from nearly $1 billion down to $200 million in order to pay down the national debt. The Gorton amendment failed by a vote of 79-to-19. On June 22, the Senate voted on S. 2522, passing the bill by a vote of 95-to-4. Next, the aid package will be considered by a conference committee between the House and the Senate to reconcile differences between S. 2522 and H.R. 3908.

Amendments to S. 2522: The following is a list of the Senators who voted for Amendments to limit U.S. aid to Colombia.

S.AMDT. 3518 was introduced by Sen. Wellstone (D-MD) to shift $225 million from the push into Southern Colombia to fund domestic treatment. The following Senators voted in favor of S.AMDT. 3518: Boxer (D-CA) (co-sponsor), Byrd (D-WV), Dorgan (D-ND), Feingold (D-WI), Grams (R-MN), Harkin (D-IA), Leahy (D-VT), Mikulski (D-MD), Murray (D-WA), Specter (R-PA), Wellstone (D-MN) (sponsor).

S.AMDT 3517 was introduced by Sen. Gorton (R-WA) to cut the Colombian aid package from nearly $1 billion to $200 million. The following Senators voted in favor of S.AMDT. 3517: Allard (R-CO), Boxer (D-CA), Collins (R-ME), Craig (R-ID), Crapo (R-ID), Enzi (R-WY), Fitzgerald (R-IL), Gorton (R-WA), Gramm (R-TX), Grams (R-MN), Gregg (R-NH), Harkin (D-IA), Hutchinson (R-AR), Kohl (D-WI), Leahy (D-VT), Mikulski (D-MD), Murray (D-WA), Specter (R-PA), Thomas (R-WY).

VIII. ISSUES WITH U.S. AID TO COLOMBIA

Coca Cultivation Portability: Traditionally, coca has been grown in Peru and Bolivia. But eradication efforts there have created incentives to grow coca in Colombia. From 1995 to 1999, Peru experienced a 66% reduction in coca cultivation and Bolivia experienced a 53% reduction. But Colombia experienced substantial growth in coca cultivation. In Peru, coca cultivation fell from 115,300 hectares in 1995 to 38,700 hectares in 1999. In Bolivia coca cultivation fell from 48,600 hectares in 1995 to 21,800 hectares in 1999. Coca cultivation in Colombia has doubled from 50,900 hectares in 1995 to 122,500 hectares in 1999. New strains of coca leaf are cultivated that have a substantially higher cocaine yield than the traditional plant. Many experts fear coca eradication in Colombia will lead to new or expanded coca cultivation in Ecuador, Venezuela, and Brazil. (Source: White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, “Clinton Administration’s Proposal for U.S. Assistance to Plan Colombia”).

“[D]espite two years of extensive herbicide spraying, [in Colombia] U.S. estimates show there has not been any net reduction in coca cultivation – net coca cultivation actually increased 50 percent,” reported the General Accounting Office in 1999. (Source: General Accounting Office, “Drug Control: Narcotics Threat from Colombia Continues to Grow,” June 22, 1999, GAO/NSIAD-99-136 Drug Control).

Eradication is Less Effective in Reducing Drug Use Then Treatment: In 1994, the RAND Corporation found that domestic treatment is 23.03 times more effective than source-country drug control efforts. In order to reduce cocaine consumption in the U.S. by 1% it would cost $34 million in treatment, $783 million in source-country control (i.e. crop eradication), or $336 million in interdiction efforts (cocaine seizures by the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Army, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service). (Source: C. Peter Rydell and Susan S. Everingham, RAND Corporation, “Controlling Cocaine: Supply Versus Demand Programs,” 1994, Sponsored in part by the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy).

Eradication Ineffectiveness: Since 1978, Colombia – with substantial U.S. aid – has been engaged in aerial fumigation of coca, poppy, and marijuana crops. Yet, there has been no reduction in the area used for cultivation, said Ricardo Vargas, a sociologist and expert on narcotics policies with Acción Andina. The increase in coca cultivation in the past five years, from 50,900 hectares to 122,500 hectares, corresponds with the expansion of aerial eradication efforts. Vargas said that in Peru the reduction in hectares used for cultivation was achieved without the use of any chemicals. (Source: Ricardo Vargas, Executive Summary, “Drug Cultivation. Fumigation and the Conflict in Colombia, October, 1999).

In 1998, the “[Colombian] eradication campaign sprayed record amounts of coca, over 65,000 hectares,” said the Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Rand Beers. He reported that, “[In 1999] the CNP [Colombian National Police] has sprayed over 7,600 hectares of opium poppy, a record total.” (Source: Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Statement before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, September 21, 1999, www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/990921_beers_caucus.html).

No Eradication Targets or Timetable in Colombia: In a hearing of the House Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources on February 15, Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-IL) criticized the Colombian aid package for failing to establish a target for reducing cocaine use in the U.S. or providing an exit strategy from Colombia. Furthermore, she said, the Colombian aid package only targets interdiction and eradication efforts. (Source: Statement of Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-IL) before the Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources , February 15, 2000).

Human Rights and Judicial Reform are Inadequately Addressed: The Clinton Administration’s Assistance Plan “requires the GOC (government of Colombia) to ensure that these resources are only used by units that meet stringent human rights criteria.” However, only 2% of the $1.3997 billion two-year aid package goes to the improvement of human rights conditions, only 2% goes to judicial reform, and only 3% goes to law enforcement and the rule of law. (Source: White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, “Clinton Administration’s Proposal for U.S. Assistance to Plan Colombia”).

Colombian Military Collaboration in Human Rights Abuses: In 1999, the State Department reported that the Colombian military is aiding right-wing paramilitaries. The report said, “Credible allegations of cooperation [of the Colombian armed forces] with paramilitary groups, including instances of both silent support and direct collaboration by members of the armed forces, in particular the army, continued. There were tacit arrangements between local military commanders and paramilitary groups in some regions, and paramilitary groups operated freely in some areas that were under military control. . . Some local army and police commanders tacitly tolerated – and sometimes aided and abetted – the activities of paramilitary groups. . . . ” (Source: “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,” U.S. Department of State, February 1999). It is estimated that paramilitary groups were responsible for 78% of political killings in Colombia in 1999. (Source: Human Rights Watch World Report 2000).