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3. Drug use and The First Amendment -- A Right?
Professor Polsby draws an interesting parallel between
pornography and drug use. His argument is designed to
make the point that even when a thing might be appropriate
for adults but is an evil for children (books or motion
pictures with adult content), we do not ban adults from
using the material. We should not child-proof the world,
he notes approvingly. He anticipates the rebuttal that
this is "a First Amendment case to be sure,"[24]
which suggests a wholly different point regarding the
First Amendment.
In an important respect, drugs are like speech or they
are like books -- and their use should be protected
by the First Amendment. The purpose of the First Amendment
is to protect our ability to make up our mind. The purpose
was not simply to protect the printing business --
it was to protect our ability to obtain information
and ideas. We have extended the protection of the Freedom
of Speech and of the Press beyond the reach of the words
in the amendment to include poetry, song, motion pictures,
paintings, photographs, the internet, expression of
all kinds, even when the expression is obtuse, obscure,
or offensive. The purpose of the amendment is ultimately
to protect the ability of the viewer, the listener,
the experiencer, to have the ideas, thoughts, experiences,
or emotions the expression might generate. The purpose
is not simply to protect the maker of the sounds or
images. We protect the ability of the audience members,
the readers, the listeners, and the experiencers, to
be uplifted by music, to be enthralled by opera, to
be made joyful, to be saddened, to be enraged, to empathize
as a consequence of the external stimulation we characterize
now as "expression." The purpose is to provide for whatever
emotional or intellectual experience humans are capable
of that can contribute to making up one's mind. The
taking of various drugs triggers the same kinds of experiences.[25]
In a more concrete sense, when a person reads, watches
or listens, the sensory signals to the eyes or ears
are converted into chemical signals that are transmitted
through the central nervous system to various parts
of the brain and provide stimulation of thoughts, memory
and meaning. Drugs do the same thing. Drugs affect the
chemical signals that are transmitted through the central
nervous system. They are another form of stimulation
of the mind. If constitutionally protected speech makes
a person laugh, should not the person have a protected
right to choose the direct chemical stimuli that they
believe will make them laugh, using marijuana or nitrous
oxide, for example? If a person can choose a work of
philosophy to try to understand meaning and existence,
isn't the choice of ingesting a chemical that may
have the same effect protected? If constitutionally
protected advertising can stimulate appetite, should
not the person who is the target of the advertising --
often unwilling or unwitting -- have the right
to choose a chemical means to directly stimulate appetite?
Our law, our courts, and our society condemn censorship
when forms of expression are banned, recognizing that
such measures violate the First Amendment to the Constitution.
We fully appreciate the outrage of the audience deprived
by censorship of their right to receive information,
as well as the outrage of the author at the suppression
of his or her work. Rarely is the audience prosecuted.
For example, those who went to hear Lenny Bruce or 2 Live Crew
did not risk being arrested. However, in punishing drug
users for the simple possession of drugs, we not only
deprive an audience which chooses the stimulation, we
persecute it.
But the analogy to censorship is much too limited.
As noted above, peyote is a schedule I controlled
substance which is the sacrament used in the worship
of the Native American Church of North America. When
people are denied the right to use these kinds of compounds
under the drug laws for these kinds of purposes, these
laws become indistinguishable from religious persecution.[26]
Those who insist that they have the right and the power
to deny other citizens the right to experiences in and
of their minds -- in order to protect them from
"drug abuse" -- are usually proud that they have
never used drugs. It is as though we entrusted prosecution,
judgment and sentencing in obscenity cases to those
who never actually looked at the material in question.
Neuro scientists have located throughout the brain
anatomical structures, called receptors, which react
uniquely to various drugs, including tetrahydrocannabinol,
the principal active ingredient in marijuana. Researchers
have found the chemical that is endogenously produced
which uniquely activates that receptor, which the discoverers
have named anandamide. The brain is filled with receptors
that are activated uniquely by THC and its endogenously
produced twin. When these receptors are activated, and
they can be activated only by these chemicals, then
a person has the experience of being intoxicated by
marijuana. If one believes that humans have been created
by God, including all of the intricate structures in
our body such as the eye and the brain, then one might
say, "we have been hard-wired by God to get stoned."
In essence, those who claim the power to prohibit the
use of drugs such as marijuana claim the power to declare
portions of the brain of other citizens to be "off limits"
to them.
Of course, this asserted First Amendment right to use
drugs is unrecognized. It is unrecognized in the same
manner that the right of women to vote was not recognized
or protected until the Nineteenth Amendment took effect
in 1920. What is the scope of this right? I suggest
that the right to use drugs is subject to regulation
in some respects to protect the public just as the First
Amendment is limited by libel law, or newspapers are
regulated by antitrust law.
If we find that there seems to be much in the drug
experience that is cheap or base, it is perhaps because
that the cheap and base is the greater share of human
experience. If we examine the totality of the popular
literature, popular music, or other arts, we would find
that the mediocre outnumbers the outstanding. For most
forms of expression quality is extolled and promoted.
If a musical composition or performance is especially
pleasing, we are delighted and we recommend it. Similarly,
if a poem, a prayer, a play, or a novel is well-done
or inspirational, we recommend it and encourage its
reproduction. A bad work of art disappears as lacking
popular appeal.
However, the situation involving good and bad drug
experiences is largely reversed. Bad drug experiences
are well-recorded and frequently well-reported. The
newspapers are quick to report drug overdoses and poisonings.
The exaggeration of these experiences is deliberate.
U.S. Senator Abraham Ribicoff, commenting at hearings
on LSD in the 1960s said, "Only when you sensationalize
a subject matter do you get reform. Without sensationalizing,
you don't."[27]
At their most catastrophic, unsuccessful drug experiences
are referred to the emergency rooms of hospitals, or
to morgues and medical examiners. While unsuccessful
First Amendment experiences are rarely so severe, clinicians
report that persons are disturbed by motion pictures
they witness and from other protected speech. At another
level, those writings that led to the holocaust and
World War II, such as Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf,
are found in libraries throughout the United States.
Because a good drug experience is illegal, the role
of drug use in the experience is often hidden, disregarded
or discounted. How often does the discoverer, the scientist,
the inventor announce that his or her insight was aided
by using LSD or marijuana? To do so would risk having
the result discounted, no matter what its objective
merit. Therefore the drug experience is usually hidden.
To argue that the use of a drug had a positive effect
is sure to elicit the inevitable rejoinder, "what about
the addicts, the crimes, the lives wasted?"
Yet in 1995, Dr. Kary Mullis, the 1993 Nobel prize
laureate in chemistry said, "I think I might have been
stupid in some respects, if it weren't for my psychedelic
experiences."[28] When an idea is expressed as the fruit
of a drug experience, the idea is attacked a priori
as inferior or ridiculous, and the speaker is attacked
as "pro-drug."
Inevitably, all non-prohibition drug policy ideas are
now challenged with, "what about crack cocaine?" Indisputably,
crack cocaine is viewed as the great demonic
drug of our time. The image of the most degraded drug
addict is no longer associated with heroin, but with
crack. It is the image of the "skeezer," a coke whore
who will routinely and repeatedly perform fellatio for
$10 to buy a rock of crack.[29]
Of course, in the public mind, the crack addict is not
a person deserving pity or empathy (or the opportunity
for treatment), but an object for revulsion, disgust,
contempt and malevolence. Society is quite comfortable
kicking a man when he is down, if he is a crack addict.
The public image of crack is hard-core cocaine addiction,[30] and all the worst social disorder associated
with addiction to prohibited drugs. There is a great
deal of violence in the crack markets.[31] But much of crack's status is the result
of media exaggeration.
Given crack's bad reputation, is there a First Amendment
right to use crack, per se? The Supreme Court
has upheld prohibition of obscene speech on the ground
that obscenity does not convey any ideas.[32]
One might ask, what "ideas" does someone get from using
crack? A First Amendment absolutist might say, "The
use of crack is part of a right to choose the stimulation
of one's central nervous system and the impressions
one feels irrespective of the drug chosen or the feeling
generated." One inclined to avoid being quoted making
a socially outrageous claim might say, "While the right
to seek and achieve such stimulation may apply to the
use of entheogens or psychedelic drugs, crack use as
it is actually experienced is such a different kind
of drug use, it is not so protected."
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II
Go to Introduction
Go to Section III
Go to Section IV
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